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TOWARDS AN OUTCRIT PEDAGOGY OF ANTI-
SUBORDINATION IN THE CLASSROOM 
SHEILA I. VÉLEZ MARTÍNEZ*
The reason I left [university] in my second year was because I felt that 
professors could be just as selfish and foolish as everybody else.1
INTRODUCTION
I. CLASSROOM PEDAGOGY IN U.S. LAW SCHOOLS
II. HOW TRADITIONAL LAW SCHOOL PEDAGOGY HAS FAILED
 OUTSIDER GROUPS
III. OUTCRIT POSITIONALITY ON PEDAGOGY




The dominant model of legal education is in crisis.2 The current de-
bate surrounding the “existential crisis” of legal education sets the stage for 
a critical assessment of traditional legal education pedagogy and how it can 
be improved in ways that would promote justice and anti-subordination 
practices within the law school.3 Because LatCrit theory has paid close 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Muchas gracias to Jules 
Lobel, Beth Lyon, and Jessie Allen for their comments and suggestions on the various drafts of this 
paper.
 1.  Julia Lowrie Henderson & Pejk Malinovski, Interview: A Final Visit with Pete Seeger,
STUDIO 360 (Jan. 31, 2014, 2:40), http://www.studio360.org/story/a-final-visit-with-pete-seeger/. 
 2.  Paul Lippe, Why Waste the Crisis in Legal Education?, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 7, 2013, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/lawschool.next; Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the 
Crisis in Legal Education: Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1745, 1746. 
 3.  Anti-subordination refers to a positionality that challenges practices and policies that by intent 
or effect enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups. It also strives to develop 
practices and policies capable of redressing entrenched structures of inequality. See generally Owen M. 
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Reva B. Siegel, The 
American Civil Rights Tradition—Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9
(2004); Marc Tizoc Gonzalez et. al, Afterword: Change and Continuity: An Introduction to the LatCrit 
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attention both to knowledge production and to its principled performance, it 
is uniquely positioned to propose new approaches to legal education that 
fuse theory and action as central to anti-subordination in academic prac-
tice.4 This paper seeks to provide a theoretical framework that informs a 
pedagogical practice of anti-subordination within the law school classroom 
setting.
The law school classroom is a space of privilege and power that mir-
rors society.5 For over thirty years, critical legal scholars have discussed 
how law professors’ traditional pedagogical practices further the reproduc-
tion of hierarchies of power and subordination.6 Traditional pedagogy, as 
expected, models for students how they are supposed to think, feel, and act 
in their future professional roles.7 Furthermore, through traditional peda-
gogy, law professors contribute to the continued legal consolidation of 
power and legal knowledge in preservation of the status quo, that is the 
preservation of euroheteropatriarchal paradigms.8 Outcrit scholars9 have 
taken the discussion of hierarchy in legal education beyond the initial po-
 4.  Steven W. Bender and Francisco Valdes, At and Beyond Fifteen: Mapping LatCrit Theory, 
Community, and Praxis, 1 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 177, 194 (2011); Francisco Valdes, 
Rebellious Knowledge Production, Academic Activism, & Outsider Democracy: From Principles to 
Practices in LatCrit Theory, 1995 to 2008, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 131, 153–54 (2009). 
 5.  Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
591, 591–95 (1982). 
 6.  Id.
 7.  Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 
(David Kairys ed., Basic Books 3d ed. 1998). See also Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 22 (1990), for a critical view of the widely used role model argument. 
 8.  DECONSTRUCTING PRIVILEGE: TEACHING AND LEARNING AS ALLIES IN THE CLASSROOM 1, 4 
(Kim A. Case ed., 2013). 
 9.  Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: 
Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L. J. 65, 67–70 (2003) [hereinafter Valdes, 
Outsider Jurisprudence]. I subscribe to Valdes’ description of OutCrit scholars:  
OutCrit positionality is framed around the need to confront in collective and coordinated ways 
the mutually-reinforcing tenets and effects of two sociological macro-structures that currently 
operate both domestically and internationally: Euroheteropatriarchy and neoliberal globaliza-
tion. Therefore, among them are the legal scholars who in recent times have pioneered the 
various strands of outsider critical jurisprudence—OutCrits. 
Id. at 67 n.5; see also Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Legal Theory & Outcrit Perspectivity: 
Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 831, 840–41 (2000) [herein-
after Valdes, Outsider Scholars] (discussing the relationship between Euroheteropatriarchy and OutCrit 
theory and praxis). The term “Outsider Jurisprudence” was first used by Professor Mari J. Matsuda. See
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2323 (1989). Latcrit Theory is one strand in outsider jurisprudence along with Critical Race 
Theory, Critical Race Feminism, Asian American Scholarship and Queer Legal Theory. See generally
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: LatCrit Theory: Some Preliminary Notes Towards a Transatlantic 
Dialogue, 9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2000); Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, supra note 9 
(discussing the history and current perspective of “Outsider Jurisprudence”); Francisco Valdes, After-
word: Theorizing “Outcrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experi-
ence—RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999) (drawing lessons for 
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lemic of critical legal scholars by redefining the players in multiple rela-
tionships of power. For instance, for Outcrit scholars, the student is not 
only defined by her relationship with education; rather, she is a multi-
identitarian being that has to resist subordination within the legal academia 
and has to deal simultaneously with other forms of subordination like rac-
ism, sexism and homophobia, just to name a few.10 Even though Outcrit 
theory has seen from its beginning the fusion of theory and action as central 
to the anti-subordination agenda, the discussion regarding praxis within the 
classroom could benefit from further development. 
Save notable exceptions,11 Outcrit scholars have largely confined 
themselves to the use of traditional law school pedagogy while aspiring to 
“teach anti-subordination knowledge and foster the ability of students to 
decolonize themselves and others.”12 I propose that using formal or tradi-
tional legal education pedagogy is itself a contradiction of anti-
subordination principles, inasmuch as traditional pedagogy is inherently 
hierarchical and validates euroheteropatriarchal perspectives. My critique 
to the use of the traditional course book pedagogies can be summed up as 
follows: (1) It ignores best practices in teaching and critical pedagogy; (2) 
Because of that, it is not only a poor educational tool for most students but 
also has a particular oppressive effect in female students and students of 
color.
Outcrit pedagogy practices should strive to build in the classroom a 
democratic space that is emancipatory, creates conditions for learning, and 
fosters the critical exploration of society.13 A critical exploration of society 
should serve as a provocation for students to act to transform the conditions 
of subordination. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary not only to teach 
about deconstructing privilege, building social justice, and the intersection-
ality of class, race and gender. We must also teach intentionally in a way 
that recognizes and minimizes privilege inside the classroom.14 We must 
 10.  Gerald Torres & Katie Pace, Understanding Patriarchy as an Expression of Whiteness: 
Insights from the Chicana Movement, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 130 (2005). 
 11.  Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2025, 2026–27 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and The River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2238 (1992); Saru Matambanadzo, Fumbling Toward a Critical 
Legal Pedagogy and Practice, 4 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 90, 91 (2006); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence 
and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and 
Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263, 298 (2000); SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy: Classroom 
Justice in the Law School Setting, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 467, 470–71 (2012). 
 12.  Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 65. 
 13.  Id. at 73–74. 
 14.  Kim A. Case, Beyond Diversity and Whiteness: Developing a Transformative and Intersec-
tional Model of Privilege Studies Pedagogy, in DECONSTRUCTING PRIVILEGE: TEACHING AND 
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teach in a way that challenges the power differential between professors 
and students and fosters a horizontal teaching and learning community. 
From an anti-subordination perspective, critical reflection on our ped-
agogical praxis has to be constant to avoid the peril of having students per-
ceive our discourse as nothing more than empty words.15 Teaching anti-
subordination perspectives through a pedagogical practice that is non-
hierarchical and democratic is but one bridge that we as Outcrit scholars 
have yet to cross. It is the purpose of this article to help us to continue mov-
ing in that direction. 
In particular, this paper discusses how traditional teaching practices 
can reinforce systemic discrimination, exclusion, subordination and oppres-
sion within the classroom. The paper traces the discussions about pedagogy 
in Outcrit literature and proposes that teaching techniques within the class-
room have to reflect anti-subordination perspectives. Drawing from the 
critical pedagogy work of Paulo Freire, Derrick Bell and others, the paper 
proposes that teaching from an anti-subordination perspective requires 
praxis of collaborative, non-hierarchical teaching. This paper seeks to offer 
a theoretical basis to elaborate future practices that can help build a more 
democratic and inclusive classroom. In particular, I propose that we have to 
forgo authority as the basis of the teacher-student relationship. Forgoing 
authority means finding a new basis for the relationship: collaboration. This 
includes collaboration in the production of knowledge. 
Part I of the article discusses the trajectory of the Langdellian method 
as the dominant pedagogy in U.S. law schools. Part II highlights the main 
standing critiques to the Langdellian method, in particular those related to 
the impact it has historically had on women and students of color. Part III 
surveys Outcrit positionality on pedagogy with particular emphasis on the 
work of Derrick Bell. 
Part IV argues that Outcrit positionality on pedagogy should engage in 
an epistemological change: thus, not assuming that the professor is all-
knowing and should occupy center stage in the classroom. I propose that 
teaching should be engaged to form praxis of collaboration that frees the 
student to think independently and leads to an experience where there is a 
non-oppressive dialectic relationship between students and professors. 
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I. CLASSROOM PEDAGOGY IN U.S. LAW SCHOOLS
Professors assume the role as the repository of knowledge, which is often 
withheld and strategically and titillatingly revealed.16
The mainstream pedagogy still prevalent in most law school class-
rooms, or the “imperial tradition,” as aptly described by Margaret E. Mon-
toya and Francisco Valdes, “is as old as the establishment of formal legal 
education in the United States.”17 The use of the phrase “imperial tradition” 
to describe the prevalent law school pedagogy is consistent with the con-
temporary conversation regarding the nature of the U.S. academy as an 
“Imperial University.”18 In particular, Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira 
contend that: “[a]s is in all imperial and colonial nations, intellectuals and 
scholarship play an important role—directly or indirectly, willingly or un-
wittingly—in legitimizing American exceptionalism and rationalizing U.S. 
expansionism and repression, domestically and globally.”19
Another salient characteristic of legal education in the United States, 
which is consistent with the imperial tradition, is that, like higher education 
as a whole, it has increasingly become a commodity to be sold in a compet-
itive market by universities to their “customers,” who are for the most part 
heavily indebted students.20 Many commodification scholars note that quite 
often “those whom commodification objectifies become entrenched as 
society’s subordinated class.”21 Conversely, because “market relations re-
flect, create, and reinforce social relations, . . . those who control the terms 
 16.  Robert S. Chang & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Up is Hard to Do: Race/Gender/Sexual 
Orientation in the Law School Classroom, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 3–4 (2010). Chang and Davis 
further stress that “[a]uthority and classroom command become crucial in this mode of conveying 
knowledge. Students often dread being called on or participating, experiencing classroom exchanges as 
humiliating exercises in which success is futile.” Id. at 4. 
 17.  Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, “Latinas/os” and the Politics of Knowledge 
Production: LatCrit Scholarship and Academic Activism as Social Justice Action, 83 IND. L.J. 1197, 
1209 (2008). 
 18.  Piya Chatterjee & Sunaina Maira, The Imperial University: Race, War and the Nation-State,
in THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC REPRESSION AND SCHOLARLY DISSENT 1, 6 (Piya Chatterjee 
& Sunaina Maira eds., 2014). 
 19.  Id. at 6–7. Chatterjee & Maira add that, “U.S. imperialism is characterized by deterritorial-
ized, flexible, and covert practices of subjugation and violence and as such does not resemble historical 
forms of European colonialism that depended on territorial colonialism.” Id at 7. For them, the acade-
my’s role in support of state politics is crucial, particularly because it is a liberal institution that legiti-
mizes the imperial agenda via humanitarian and culture wars. Id.
 20.  George Caffentzis, A Russell Scholar Lecture: A Critique of Commodified Education and 
Knowledge (From Africa to Maine) 1 (Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.commoner.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/caffentzis_critiqueeducation.pdf. 
 21.  Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 8 (Martha M. Ertman 
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of commodification secure their position in society’s ruling class.”22 “Alt-
hough many young lawyers enter law school with rather vague ambitions to 
serve justice, the combination of their educational loan debts and the temp-
tation to earn far higher salaries serving commercial interests tends to steer 
their careers away from public service.”23 Law school faculties do not es-
cape from participation in this process of commodification and enjoy a 
position of privilege that situates them generally closer to university man-
agement.24 However, law school faculties’ position of privilege is also in-
creasingly proletarized.25 This means that law school faculties serve a 
function within the scheme of capitalist accumulation of the academic in-
dustry. As such, mainstream pedagogical practices in academic institutions 
in the United States—law schools included—cannot be viewed as neutral 
but as part of the role assigned to educational institutions in the preserva-
tion of imperial privilege in the neoliberal economy. For example, law 
schools have played an important role in the export of the American legal 
system into the imperial conquest of the nineteenth century, the post-World 
War II occupied nations, and most recently in the United States’ “nation 
building” efforts.26
A. Dominant Pedagogy in U.S. Law Schools: Short Journey, Long 
Reign
One style of pedagogy has dominated law school teaching in the Unit-
ed States with only periodic yet important changes since 1875, when Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell introduced it to Harvard Law School.27 “Under 
the influence of Langdellian formalism and scientism,” this prevalent ped-
agogy in law school is dependent “on legal doctrine as woven by appellate 
judges.”28 It is largely predicated in the use of the “case method” or “Lang-
 22.  Id.
 23.  Nick Smith, Commodification in Law: Ideologies, Intractabilities, and Hyperboles, 42 
CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 1, § 2.14 (2009). 
 24.  WESLEY SHUMAR, COLLEGE FOR SALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE COMMODIFICATION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 115 (Routledge Falmer 1997). 
 25.  Id. at 63. 
 26.  See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN 
LATIN AMERICA 18–19 (1980); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and 
the “Rule of Law”, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2279–87 (2003); Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A 
Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 393–94 
(2003). 
 27.  See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS v–vii (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1871). 
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dellian method” to teach students to think like lawyers.29 In Langdell’s own 
words:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. 
To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with con-
stant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is 
what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should 
be the business of every earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines 
has arrived at its present state by slow degrees . . . in many cases through 
centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cas-
es; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering doc-
trine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.30
Some scholars have often erroneously referred to this method as the 
Socratic method.31 The designation of the Langdellian method of instruc-
tion as the Socratic method has been criticized as a mischaracterization of 
the true nature of Socratic dialogue.32 The case method as conceived by 
Langdell involves a teacher asking a series of questions, usually to a single 
student, in an attempt to lead the student “down a chain of reasoning either 
forward, to its conclusions or backward to its assumptions.”33 Professor 
Neumann, in his thought provoking article, “A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Art of Critique,”34 masterfully deconstructs the way the Langdellian meth-
od as it is currently used in law school is in fact Protagorean as it coincides 
with the techniques of Protagoras, Socrates’ rival.35 In particular, Neumann 
highlights that it was Protagoras who taught students how to develop equal-
ly plausible arguments for and against a given proposition.36 For Neumann 
the wide use of the Langdellian Method has had the “unfortunate effect of 
inhibiting law school teachers from developing a more truly Socratic meth-
od of critique, one that can better teach analytical art to individual students 
while avoiding the hazards of the Langedellian technique.”37 Neumann 
explains that the most important element of a true Socratic method is left 
out of the Langdellian method: where students have the opportunity to 
engage in knowledge production.38
 29.  LANGDELL, supra note 27, at vi. 
 30.  Id.
 31.  Richard K. Neumann Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 
725, 729 (1989). 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (1993). 
 34.  Neumann, supra note 31, at 728–29. 
 35.  Id.
 36.  Id. at 729. 
 37.  Id. at 730. 
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Langdell introduced new law school pedagogy to a young academic 
field. At that time, law as an academic field borrowed from the prevalent 
European model of that era and stressed a general education with an aca-
demic emphasis on law subjects.39 Law was taught much like history or 
economics, and the study of law focused on legal doctrine and theory.40
Langdell introduced the instruction of students in legal doctrine through the 
study of written judicial opinions.41 Up to this point, the method of legal 
instruction in law schools was a combination of the lecture method and the 
text method, meaning students read texts that related and summarized par-
ticular bodies of law, and professors lectured on that material in class.42
Until that time, “[l]egal education in the United States was primarily 
achieved through apprenticeship training and self-study.”43 The apprentice-
ship model was predicated on having a practitioner instruct the pupil both 
on issues regarding legal doctrine and lawyering-related skills.44 The stu-
dent-attorney would remain associated with the lawyer for the period re-
quired to become an adept lawyer. The student-attorney-in-training would 
also be expected to “engage in independent study, often copying portions 
of legal treatises and making extensive notes.”45 “At the end of the eight-
eenth century, single lawyers or small groups of lawyers began to open 
proprietary law schools, and provided lectures to groups of students who 
sought to become lawyers.”46
While the case method has been the subject of constant criticism and 
debate since its introduction in 1870, Langdell’s innovation is generally 
viewed as “the most significant event in the evolution of American legal 
A true Socratic dialogue is divided in two parts: the elenchus and the psychagogia. In the 
elenchus, the teacher’s questions guide the student to an understanding of the nature and ex-
tent of his or her ignorance. . . . In the psychagogia (literally, the leading of a soul), the ques-
tions help the student construct the knowledge that the elenchus showed was lacking.  
Id. at 730. 
 39.  Charles R. McManis, The History of First Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist 
Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 597, 637 (1981). 
 40.  A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1949, 1974 (2012). 
 41.  Rob Trousdale, White Privilege and the Case-Dialogue Method, 1 WM. MITCHELL L. RAZA J.
29 (2010). 
 42.  Spencer, supra note 40, at 1973. 
 43.  MARGARET MARTIN BARRY et al., PILNET, LEGAL EDUCATION “BEST PRACTICES” REPORT,
UNITED STATES 1 (2010). 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id.
 46.  1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND 
PRIMARY SOURCES 13–16 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); Charles R. McManis, The History of First 
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education.”47 During its 100-year reign, the Langdellian method nonethe-
less has experienced changes. As Valdes and Montoya explain: 
But this original version of this model—like all other versions under the 
other models—has been in constant flux, even as it has become en-
trenched in its near-hegemonic form. Thus, during the first half of the 
last century, “realists” who sought to elevate the importance of social re-
ality in the understanding and crafting of legal rules challenged the early 
premises and purist Langdellian practices of the mainstream, or tradi-
tional, model. They succeeded, making empiricism part of the modern 
imperial tradition as practiced today.48
Still, the legal education model as it stands today continues to create 
“dehumanized individuals” in order to “perpetuate and protect the econom-
ic stakes held by barons of global capitalism.”49 It has remained the domi-
nant pedagogy because it serves its purpose of producing law students 
ready for employment in the ruling class’s service.50
B. Standing Critiques to the Case Method 
The case method in law school has not survived without critique. It 
has been under fire for a host of different reasons since the early years after 
its wide acceptance by law schools. 51 A long line of articles and reports by 
scholars, foundations, and ABA special committees has consistently high-
lighted the need for pedagogical diversification in law school.52 Most of the 
critiques regarding the exclusive use of the case method have gravitated 
 47.  McManis, supra note 46, at 598. 
 48.  Montoya & Valdes, supra note 17, at 1209.
 49.  Matambanadzo, supra note 11, at 91. 
 50.  Id.
 51.  See Arthur D. Austin, Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 164–
65 (1965); Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2000); A.V. Dicey, The Teaching of English Law at Harvard, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 422, 429 (1900); Jerome Frank, What Constitutes A Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723, 
726 (1933); Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 913 (1933); 
Lon L. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 
193–95 (1948) (arguing that the current method of legal education is ineffective because it only focuses 
on one form of adjudication, the appellate decision, while neglecting all other forms of adjudication, as 
well as the entire legislative process); W. David Slawson, Changing How We Teach: A Critique of the 
Case Method, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 343, 344–46 (2000); John H. Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae 
Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae, 30 HARV. L. REV. 812, 818–20 (1917). 
 52.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_education
_and_professional_development_maccrate_report%29.authcheckdam.pdf; AMER. BAR ASS’N, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION (Jan. 2014), available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_rec
ommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE
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around its pedagogical deficiencies to in fact teach students to “think like a 
lawyer”53 and its inability to produce students who are practice-ready.54
In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
published a comprehensive report about legal education.55 The report high-
lighted one of the major limitations of legal education as being law 
schools’ reliance on the case method as the “one way of teaching.”56 The 
report highlights the effectiveness of the method to rapidly socialize stu-
dents into the standards of legal thinking.57 However, the report also high-
lights that “thinking through the social consequences or ethical aspects of 
the conclusions remain outside the case-dialogue method.”58 From an anti-
subordination perspective, one of the most alarming conclusions of the 
report is that since the first-year “students are told to set aside their desire 
for justice.”59 Students are expected to think like a lawyer and conform, 
rendering students to abandon the aspiration of justice that might have pro-
pelled them to go to law school.60
The 2007 publication of the book Best Practices for Legal Education: 
A Vision and a Road Map represented another critical step in the quest for 
requiring law professors to diversify their pedagogies and to include multi-
ple methods of instruction that incorporate practical experience and reduces 
the reliance on the Socratic dialogue.61 Best Practices, sponsored by the 
Clinical Legal Education Association (CLEA) and primarily authored by 
Professor Roy Stuckey of the University of South Carolina, recommended 
a series of steps for law schools to improve their programs of legal educa-
 53.  “While tradition and inertia have undoubtedly perpetuated the predominant teaching method 
in United States law school classrooms, its ultimate educational effectiveness is questionable.” Julie M. 
Spanbauer, Using a Cultural Lens in the Law School Classroom to Stimulate Self-Assessment, 48 
GONZ. L. REV. 365, 374 (2013). “[T]he case method ‘attempt[s] too much’ for the time available and 
the capacity of the average student and . . . ’[t]o plunge a student into this chaos [of cases], with his 
powers untried and imperfect, and his knowledge of principles incomplete, to grope his way through it 
as best he may, and to triangulate from case to case, supposing that he is getting forward when he is 
only going astray, is not to educate him, but tends rather to make him proof against education.’” W. 
Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 84 (1997) (quoting Edward J. Phelps, The
Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L. J. 139, 141 (1892)). 
 54.  See Spanbauer, supra note 53, at 369. 
 55.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 52. 
 56.  Id. at 5. 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Id. at 6; see also Heidi Boghosian, The Amorality of Legal Andragogy, STANFORD AGORA,
http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume2/boghosian.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (Boghosian stress-
es the importance of teaching students the moral implications of the choices lawyers make). 
 59.  See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 6.  
 60.  See Boghosian, supra note 58. 
 61.  ROY T. STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 77–
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tion in order to better prepare students for the practice of law.62 The prem-
ise of Best Practices is that U.S. law schools can and should do more to 
prepare students to become effective, ethical lawyers. 63
As A. Benjamin Spencer has recently argued, the ability of the case-
dialogue method to transmit analytical skills effectively has never been 
demonstrated.64 Elizabeth Mertz advanced this argument in her article, 
“The Language of Law School.”65 There, she describes studies of teaching 
methods that fail to show any connection between the method used and the 
ability of students to engage in effective legal analysis.66 Additionally, 
Spencer asserts that “the type of thinking promoted by the method is lim-
ited to certain kinds of legal analysis, neglecting some of the basic prob-
lem-solving skills that today’s practitioners need to develop solutions to 
their clients’ problem.”67 In anticipation of students’ interactions with their 
clients’ problems, law students should be taught to be active problem solv-
ers and not vicarious learners.68
A growing number of scholars have also voiced their concern regard-
ing the impact that the use of the case method has had in silencing and 
marginalizing women and students of color.69 Although the case-dialogue 
method has been criticized and modified in many ways over the years, it 
retains its basic hold as the fundamental framework for teaching law stu-
dents legal doctrine and analysis to this day.70 Despite myriad changes in 
the legal profession and in our understanding of how people learn, the con-
temporary law school remains remarkably Langdellian in its design as a 
three-year process in which doctrinal legal knowledge and legal analytical 
abilities are transmitted to students mostly via a traditional or modified 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id.
 64.  Spencer, supra note 40, at 2029. 
 65.  See Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to ‘Think Like a Lawyer’, 18 
RESEARCHING L., Fall 2007, at 1–2. 
 66.  Id.
 67.  Spencer, supra note 40, at 2029. 
 68.  Shirley Lung, The Problem Method: No Simple Solution, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 732–
33 (2009). “Vicarious learning refers to the process in which students learn principally by listening to 
other students engage in a one-on-one dialogue with the teacher.” Id. at 724–25. 
 69.  LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW 
SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 49 (1997) (“The pedagogical structure of the first year—
produces alienation and a gender- stratified hierarchy.”); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 190, 202 (2007) (how the traditional law school 
pedagogy has disparate effects depending on students’ race and gender); Carol J. Buckner, Realizing
Grutter v. Bollinger’s “Compelling Educational Benefits of Diversity”—Transforming Aspirational 
Rhetoric into Experience, 72 UMKC L. REV. 877, 911 (2004) (how cooperative teaching benefit stu-
dents of color). 
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case-dialogue approach, supplemented with optional or mandatory experi-
ential learning components. It must be acknowledged, however, that most 
professors vary from a pure Langdellian method in their doctrinal courses, 
and that the method has virtually no place in experiential courses.71
Many professors have indeed “increasingly blended the Socratic 
method with other, less confrontational approaches, such as lectures, dis-
cussions, simulation exercises and problem-solving sessions . . . .”72 How-
ever, this has not changed the central power dynamic that surrounds the use 
of the case method: a hierarchical control of power and knowledge that 
mirrors society and marginalizes students in multiple levels. That is, the 
professor is the center of the discussion and the validator of the production 
of knowledge. The professor continues to control what is said, who is to 
say it, how it should be said and what is correctly said. Therefore, there is 
little space for a democratic educational experience—for teaching and 
learning simultaneously. I am not suggesting that the use of the case meth-
od as originally proposed or as later reimagined and reinvented is the single 
sole reason why legal education is inherently oppressive. It is oppressive 
because it perpetuates a power structure that privileges a white Anglo-
Saxon-hetero perspective and dominance as too what is knowledge, truth 
and law under the mask of neutrality and reason. 
II. HOW TRADITIONAL LAW SCHOOL PEDAGOGY HAS FAILED
OUTSIDER GROUPS
[in the context of a meeting to reinstate minority students] [T]he then 
Dean asked me, “What’s behind those dark, inscrutable eyes?”73
Traditional law school pedagogies have been inscribed with a false 
sheer of neutrality that has largely served to obscure the classist, gendered 
and racial practices it perpetuates. Its claim to neutrality can prevail only as 
long as the presence of what makes it oppressive is left un-addressed. To 
borrow a phrase from Sylvanna Falcon and others, this can be described as 
a “perverse historical blindness.”74
As Margaret Montoya has pointed out, “The pedagogical techniques 
that are utilized in the law school classroom, which is designed architecton-
 71.  Id. at 2027. 
 72.  Eric E. Johnson, A Populist Manifesto for Learning the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 44, 49 
(2010); Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 597, 
621 (2008).  
 73.  Peggy A. Nagae, Tribute to Derrick Bell, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. i, xl (2012). 
 74.  Sylvanna Falcon et al., Teaching Outside Liberal-Imperial Discourse, in THE IMPERIAL 
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ically and epistemologically to be hierarchical, have been repeatedly shown 
to alienate and silence students, especially students of color and women 
from different backgrounds.”75 She further contends that although women 
and students of color can use silence as a form of resistance, it is more of-
ten a form of “self-censoring, resulting in centripetal, or power centering 
effects.”76
A. Women and Students of Color 
The last forty years have seen an increasing amount of discussion 
from feminist legal scholars as to the alienating and discriminatory impact 
that law school policies and pedagogy has had on female law students and 
law professors alike.77 As Catharine W. Hantzis stresses, sexism in the 
classroom mirrors and is as pervasive as sexism in society.78 The present 
law school curriculum and pedagogy continues to follow a rationalist scien-
tific model.79 The rationalist operator of the scientific model is male, as are 
the characteristics associated with the case method: objectivity, reason, 
intellect and truth.80 Because the knower is male so is the producer of the 
knowledge. It follows that the dominant style of law school teaching is an 
expression of the sexism that plagues law schools and represents a particu-
lar challenge to female students and teachers.81 Female students and teach-
ers are marginalized from the substance and process associated with 
acquiring, producing, and imparting legal knowledge. 
We should all know by now—not only from the theoretical work of 
feminist scholars but also from the social science based studies—that the 
traditional law school pedagogy has an adverse impact on female students, 
replicates white privilege-male models of knowledge and marginalizes 
women both in overt and indirect ways.82 Since at least 1970, studies re-
 75.  Montoya, supra note 11, at 299–300.  
 76.  Id. at 300. 
 77.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the 
California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 427–29 (2012); Nancy Leong, A Noteworthy Absence,
59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279, 288 (2009) (discussing the publishing disparity between male and female law 
students by analyzing quantitative data). 
 78.  Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School 
Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 155 (1988). Until quite recently, women and female professors of 
color were even absent from the fictionalized pop culture of law school. 
 79.  See Boghosian, supra note 58. 
 80.  Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 63, 73 (1993). 
 81.  Hantzis, supra note 78, at 155. 
 82.  See generally BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES 327, 
328 (Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette B. McElhiney eds., 1997); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in 
the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988); David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny?—Analyzing 
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garding women’s experiences in law school in general and in the law 
school classroom in particular have established that “female law students 
report greater deficiencies in areas ranging from lower levels of class par-
ticipation and confidence, to overall mental states and depression.”83 As 
Taunya Lovell Banks described it twenty-five years ago: 
Although some positive changes have been made, most changes in the 
teaching of law have been based primarily on what “works” for male law 
students. Women if they benefit at all, are secondary beneficiaries. Their 
concerns go largely unaddressed. Despite the increasing number of 
women entering law school, men still view women, consciously or un-
consciously, as abnormal, as strangers or outsiders.84
Even though the demographics of law school have continued to 
change, the dominant white male nature of legal education has not.85 As of 
today, forty-seven percent of all law students, law graduates and new law 
son, A Time of “Passionate Learning”: Using Feminism, Law, and Literature to Create a Learning 
Community, 60 TENN. L. REV. 393, 395 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, 
Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School”, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
61 (1988). 
 83.  Tanisha Makeba Bailey, The Master’s Tools: Deconstructing the Socratic Method and its 
Disparate Impact on Women Through the Prism of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 3 MARGINS 125, 131 
(2003). 
 84.  Banks, supra note 82, at 138. This article by Taunya Lovell Banks discusses an empirical 
study done to assess gender bias in law school and how it silences female students. The study suggested 
that women are silent because the law school classroom environment and language tend to exclude 
women and make them feel inferior. The article also served as a forward to a complete issue in the 
Journal of Legal Education dedicated to women in law school. On feminist legal theory, see generally 
Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Martha 
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 82. On gender issues related to the profession, see generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task 
Force Reports on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87 
(1988). On curriculum issues, see generally Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a 
Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988); Nancy S. 
Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988); Ann 
Shalleck, Report of the Women and the Law Project: Gender Bias and the Law School Curriculum, 38 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 97 (1988). On gender issues related to the classroom see generally Taunya Lovell 
Banks, supra note 82; Patricia A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Differ-
ence and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988); Mary Jo Eyster, Analysis of Sexism in 
Legal Practice: A Clinical Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1988); Catharine W. Hantzis, supra note 
78; Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988). 
 85.  For Marcela Rodriguez, it is because the teaching of law perpetuates and reinforces the law as 
a means of social control that institutionalizes and legitimizes a system based on the social subordina-
tion of women and gender-based hierarchies. She adds, however, that as in all constructs of knowledge 
and power, legal education also has significant potential to question and challenge the system and the 
daily reality for women in order to initiate and react to social changes. Marcela V. Rodriguez, Pedagogy 
and Law: Ideas for Integrating Gender into Legal Education, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
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students are women. 86 We have come a long way, yet female students are 
still “curiously imperceptible” and “outsiders.”87
B. Traditional Law School Pedagogy Has Failed Students of Color 
Traditional law school pedagogy has also had the effect of often si-
lencing the voices of students of color and keeping them as outsiders.88
This is both because of the style of the pedagogy and due to the absence of 
a diverse faculty that brings outsider perspectives.89 As Suzanne Homer has 
described it: 
Many students are alienated by a system that offers no support for those 
who perceive issues from a different perspective. Women and people of 
color find it difficult to spend three years as an outsider in a world creat-
ed by and for the white male establishment. Within the permissible aca-
demic legal discourse many voices are obscured. These voices reflect a 
different experience and consciousness than the voice at the lectern, but 
they are not heard unless they suppress their native tongues.90
The pervasive use of the case method pedagogy has also served to 
shroud legal analysis under the veil of racial-neutrality ever since. It effec-
tively devalues the experiences of students of color.91
 86.  See AMER. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW, COMMISSION ON 
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION (July 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_july2014.aut
hcheckdam.pdf. 
 87.  Banks, supra note 82; Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted But Not Accepted: Outsid-
ers Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 3, 44 (2013). It must be 
noted that according to the Ms. JD Project, women’s membership on law reviews correlates strongly 
with the number of women graduating from law school. However, the number of students in the editor-
in-chief position is disproportionately male. Moreover, women lost approximately five percentage 
points from the previous study in terms of the overall number of women EIC’s from 33 percent to 28.5 
percent in 2011-2012. Ms. JD, WOMEN ON LAW REVIEW: A GENDER DIVERSITY REPORT (2010), 
available at http://ms-jd.org/files/ms._jd_lr_8.23.2010.pdf. 
 88.  See Montoya, supra note 11, at 269. 
 89.  See Ian Haney-Lopez, Community Ties, Race, and Faculty Hiring: The Case for Professors 
Who Don’t Think White, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 46, 51–53 (1993); see also Mari J. Matsuda, When the 
First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 
(1989). 
 90.  Homer & Schwartz, supra note 87, at 2. 
 91.  Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School, 15 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 97 (2013). In particular Feingold and Souza argue that: 
Presenting legal analysis as a race-neutral endeavor produces racial unevenness in the follow-
ing way: allegedly race-neutral legal principles dictate what facts are relevant, sufficient or 
necessary to solve a particular legal problem. Due largely to the legacy of a White (i.e.[,] 
race-normed) judiciary, facts about race and social context have been overwhelmingly mar-
ginalized to the category of irrelevant evidence. ‘Objective’ legal analysis provides little 
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Bonita London, Geraldine Downey and Vanessa Anderson took upon 
themselves the task of documenting students’ experiences during their first 
three weeks of law school, and then assessed their self-reported levels of 
engagement at the end of the first semester.92 The research showed that 
students of color and women reported—at statistically significant higher 
rates—feeling invisible, isolated, and alienated, and reported lower fre-
quencies of volunteering in class and three times the experiences of social 
exclusion.93 Tanisha Makeba Bailey has extensively documented the long 
list of reports and empirical studies that since the 1970s have concluded 
that traditional law school pedagogy has historically disfavored women and 
students of color.94
By now there is sufficient anecdotal, empirical evidence and theoreti-
cal works regarding law school pedagogy as an oppressive practice that 
perpetuates subordination. Outcrit scholars know all of this and yet cling to 
traditional pedagogy themselves. I fear that because the voices of profes-
sors of color have also been silenced and forced to speak the language of 
the masters, we cling to authority within the classrooms to prove ourselves 
worthy using the masters’ tools.95 But Audre Lorde has always been right; 
the case method is not the masters’ tool, it is the veil to mask subjugation to 
the status quo via the exercise of authority.96 And authority is the ball that 
has been kept from professors of color and critical professors so it becomes 
the desired, the valued.97 It is also contrary to principled anti-subordination. 
 92.  Bonita London, Geraldine Downey & Vanessa Anderson, Studying Institutional Engagement: 
Utilizing Social Psychology Research Methodologies to Study Law Student Engagement, 30 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 389, 400 (2007). 
 93.  Id. at 401. 
 94.  Bailey, supra note 83, at 132–40; see also Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Educa-
tion is Failing Women, 18 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 389 (2006); Garner, supra note 82, at 1598; Homer 
& Schwartz, supra note 87, at 24–25; Alice D. Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraint 
and Personal Choice in the Formation of Professional Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462 (1972); Richard 
K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320–21 
(2000). 
 95.  This is consistent with Freire’s concept of adhesion. In the initial stages of emancipation then, 
the colonized strive for the role of the colonial master: 
The very structure of their thoughts has been conditioned by the contradictions of the con-
crete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, 
to be men is to be oppressors. . . . At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of 
the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the 
one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole.  
PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 45, 46 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 30th anniversary 
ed. 2000) (1970). 
 96.  The law is essentially a paradigm of authoritarian discourse. It is one of the discursive pillars 
of social control in modern societies, “a power structure through which social and cultural meanings, 
images, and customs are formed, reflected upon, processed, and reinforced.” Rodriguez, supra note 85, 
at 269.
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III. OUTCRIT POSITIONALITY ON PEDAGOGY
And, most important, learning to think like a lawyer need not and should 
not mean that you must stop thinking, acting, and feeling like a human 
being.98
We are like slave masters of an earlier time, part of the problem.99
The overall goal of an Outcrit pedagogy is to develop a pedagogical 
strategy that accounts for the central role of racism in higher education, and 
works toward the elimination of race and racism as part of a larger goal of 
opposing or eliminating other forms of subordination such as gender, class, 
and sexual orientation in and out of the classroom.100 But academia itself is 
a space of contradiction because it is a “racist, classist and patriarchal” 
institution that also offers spaces of contestation to teach critical classes on 
race, class, and gender or teach from a critical pedagogy perspective.101 It is 
indeed a challenge to turn classrooms into spaces for conversations regard-
ing racism, sexism and homophobia, and how to challenge them.102
Outcrit positionality, as a concept, strives to encompass a wide range 
of analyses predicated on diverse struggles for social justice that intercon-
nect outsider subordinate groups in society.103 Outcrit positionality is one 
of anti-subordination.104 The principle of anti-subordination is premised on 
the assumption that society is a hetero-racial patriarchy.105 As Ruth Colker 
points out, the problem with this hierarchy is that it denies those at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy the possibility of the fullness of their humanity. The 
anti-subordination principle is a group-based perspective grounded in an 
understanding of the way certain groups have been historically treated une-
qually.106
It is well settled among Outcrit scholars that the works of critical ped-
agogy scholars, such as Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux, largely inform 
 98.  DERRICK BELL JR., The Law Student as Slave, in THE DERRICK BELL READER 278, 279
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005) [hereinafter BELL, Student as Slave].
 99.  Id. at 281. 
 100.  Daniel G. Solórzano & Tara J. Yosso, Maintaining Social Justice Hopes Within Academic 
Realities: A Freirean Approach to Critical Race/LatCrit Pedagogy, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 595, 596 
(2001). 
 101.  Sylvanna Falcon et al., supra note 74, at 263. 
 102.  Id. at 264. 
 103.  Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, supra note 9, at 67. 
 104.  Id. at 73. 
 105.  Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 59, 64 
(1987). 
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Outcrit positionality on pedagogy.107 Both Freire and Giroux have con-
cerned themselves with an emancipatory view of education and advocate a 
more comprehensive and communitarian approach to pedagogy.108 For 
Giroux, education is a technology of power, language, and practice that 
produces and legitimizes forms of moral and political regulation that con-
structs and offers human beings particular views of themselves and the 
world.109 Freire challenged the oppressed—a category that, according to 
Mohsen al Attar & Vernon Tava, would include law students—”to recast 
themselves as the ‘subjects’ of a dialogical learning process.”110 This is a 
role opposite of the passive and submissive role expected of students as 
“objects” in a conventional (banking) legal education.111
It is interesting to note that Outcrit scholars, when concerned with the 
incorporation of critical pedagogy to the law school curriculum, have large-
ly occupied themselves with changing the substantive themes of law 
school. This includes the creation of additional courses on race, Latino 
culture, feminism, queer culture, indigenous culture, and human rights—
inclusion of outside perspectives in the traditional courses taught in law 
schools. What has largely been absent in the discussion is how to teach in a 
way that represents the principles of critical pedagogy. The notable excep-
tion has been Derrick Bell.112
John Dewey asked one hundred years ago, “Why is it that, in spite of 
the fact that teaching by pouring in, learning by passive absorption, are 
universally condemned, that they are still so entrenched in practice?”113
 107.  See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 11, at 2248; Matambanadzo, supra note 11, at 91; Montoya, 
supra note 11, at 882–83; SpearIt, supra note 11, at 469–70. 
 108.  See generally Henry A. Giroux, Critical Pedagogy and the Postmodern/Modern Divide: 
Towards a Pedagogy of Democratization, TCHR. EDUC. Q., Winter 2004, at 31. 
 109.  Margaret E. Montoya, Comment, Voicing Differences, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 161–62 n.49 
(1997) (quoting HENRY A. GIROUX, BORDER CROSSINGS: CULTURAL WORKERS AND THE POLITICS OF 
EDUCATION 81 (Routledge Falmer 1992)). 
 110.  Mohsen al Attar & Vernon Tava, Twail Pedagogy—Legal Education for Emancipation, 15 
PALESTINE YEARBOOK INT’L L. 7, 32–33 (2009). 
 111.  Id.
 112.  Derrick Bell, Constitutional Conflicts: The Perils and Rewards of Pioneering in the Law 
School Classroom, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1039, 1044–45 (1998) [hereinafter Bell, Constitutional 
Conflicts]. See generally BELL, Student as Slave, supra note 98, at 278; DERRICK BELL JR., Victims as 
Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law, in THE DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 98, 
at 290; Derrick Bell Jr., A Pre-Memorial Message on Law School Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 205 (1997); Derrick A. Bell Jr., Humanity in Legal Education, 59 OR. L. REV 243 (1980); Joy 
Radice, Derrick Bell’s Community-Based Classroom, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. (SPECIAL FEATURE) 44 
(2012). 
 113.  Kara M. Kavanagh, A Dichotomy Examined: Beginning Teach for America Educators Navi-
gate Culturally Relevant Teaching and a Scripted Literacy Program in their Urban Classrooms (2010) 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgia State Univ.) (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN
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Derrick Bell understood this and his pedagogy represented a challenge to 
traditional law school pedagogy.114 His pedagogy was comprised of “equal 
parts intellectual rigor and humanity . . . .”115 It inspired not only learning 
among his students but also critical thinking about justice, and it further 
influenced a generation of law professors.116 Bell approached teaching from 
a place of anti-subordination and also a place of love.117
Bell developed specific pedagogical tools that would allow him to 
change the power dynamic within the classroom and also offer students 
different ways to engage in the process of teaching and learning. For exam-
ple, in Constitutional Conflicts: The Perils and Rewards of Pioneering in 
the Law School Classroom,118 he proposed a participatory course where 
students assumed a variety of roles: teachers, commentators, lawyers, and 
judges.119 Bell incorporated critical pedagogy in his teaching by engaging 
in a participatory approach to teaching.120 He aimed to place at the fore-
ground the role of the student and intentionally decenter his role as leader 
of the discussion in the classroom.121 For Bell, “[t]he key is to replace a 
basically passive procedure . . . with one requiring active involvement.”122
This for Bell was his way—the student-teacher contradiction that Paulo 
Freire identified.123 He aspired to a classroom experience where, as Freire 
proposed, “students become teachers and teachers become learners.”124
This phrase has been repeated like a sort of mantra for decades to the point 
of risking losing its meaning; however, we can take back its powerful mis-
sion if we assume it from an anti-subordination perspective. As Andrea 
McArdle summarized it in her tribute to Derrick Bell: 
 114.  Janet Dewart Bell, Foreword: In Memory of Professor Derrick Bell, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV iii 
(2013). 
 115.  Charlotte Garden, Bell Labs: Derrick Bell’s Inspirational Pedagogy, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
xx, xx (2013). 
 116.  As Garden summarizes, “Over the course of his four decades in the Academy, Derrick Bell 
influenced an entire generation of advocates, starting a revolution in the way law is taught in America.” 
Id. at xxii. 
 117.  Dewart Bell, supra note 114; see also Steve Bender, Derrick Bell: Oregon Trailblazer, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. ix (2013); Nagae, supra note 73, at ii. 
 118.  Bell, Constitutional Conflicts, supra note 112, at 1043. 
 119.  Id. at 1047–48; see also Andrea McArdle, “A Living, Working Faith”: Remembering Our 
Colleague Derrick Bell, Jr. as Teacher, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. (SPECIAL FEATURE) 30, 30–33 (2012). 
 120.  Bell, Constitutional Conflicts, supra note 112, at 1047. 
 121.  McArdle, supra note 119, at 31. 
 122.  Bell, Constitutional Conflicts, supra note 112, at 1049. 
 123.  Id. at 1039. Bell’s article opens quoting Freire, “[e]ducation must begin with the solution of 
the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simulta-
neously teachers and students.” FREIRE, supra note 95, at 59. 
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Derrick’s student-centered, participatory approach in the law school 
classroom has pointed the way to a pedagogical practice that ultimately 
offers more to, as it asks more of, law students. It is an approach that 
stretches and challenges us as teachers as well because it obliges us to 
confront our own authority in the classroom and surrender some control 
over student discourse. At the same time, it requires us to engage with a 
more extensive student work product. One way to remember and honor 
Derrick would be to consider taking up, or recommitting ourselves to, 
that challenge and his sense of purpose . . . .125
If we understand that, to truly overcome subordination and oppression 
we must look at the production and sharing of knowledge from a collabora-
tive perspective, a democratized view of knowledge, including the teaching 
and learning of law, must follow. 
IV. OUTCRIT PEDAGOGY GOING FORWARD: A DIFFERENT KIND OF 
TEACHING
There are two things, above all, that students want: that their professors 
challenge them and that they care about them.126
Change-agency tends to be more productive and more secure when at-
tempted collaboratively (safety in numbers) and planned well before-
hand.127
A critical approach to traditional law school teaching as part of Outcrit 
positionality will promote moving from outsider jurisprudence to an out-
sider critical pedagogy that will embrace a new epistemology of law. I 
propose, in the spirit of Ira Shor, a progressive teaching practice that in-
cludes students in the making of their education, in the production of 
knowledge about law, and in the critical analysis of justice.128 This involves 
teaching in a collaborative way, promoting democracy in the classroom, 
pedagogy of caring evidenced by feedback and attention to students, and 
respect for voices and silences and multiple identities and cultures. 
Even though it is an old saying that the best way to learn something is 
to teach it, many of us hesitate to teach collaboratively with students and to 
share the authority that being the teacher confers.129 I propose that we have 
 125.  McArdle, supra note 119, at 33. 
 126.  William Deresiewicz, Spirit Guides, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2014, 2:20 PM),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2014/08/the_best_teachers_and_professors_resemble_pare
ntal_figures_they_provide.html. 
 127.  IRA SHOR, WHEN STUDENTS HAVE POWER: NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY IN A CRITICAL 
PEDAGOGY 211 (1996). 
 128.  Id. at xi. 
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to forgo authority as the basis of the teacher-student relationship. The reli-
ance on authority perpetuates exclusion. Forgoing authority means finding 
a new basis for the relationship: collaboration. This includes collaboration 
in the production of knowledge. 
A. Progressive Epistemology 
Any pedagogical change has to be preceded by a change in epistemol-
ogy, an epistemological shift, a more humble law, drawing from the work 
of critical epistemology scholars. A new epistemology should recognize 
that “the notion of knowledge has changed radically in recent times and is 
now seen as social and contextual, at least in most social sciences and in 
the humanities.”130 Students can often be the catalyst for a professor to 
explore diverse standpoints.131 They also learn better when they are the 
proponents of meaning.132 This requires a deliberate effort because teaching 
dynamics are very difficult to alter inasmuch as “the hierarchical effects are 
so pervasive after just a few weeks of law school,” making it very difficult 
“to move out of a ‘banking’ method of teaching and to create a more egali-
tarian learning environment.”133
Outsider jurisprudence has already achieved an epistemological shift 
within legal academia by expanding the traditional boundaries of legal 
scholarship and law school curriculum, as well as including outsider per-
spectives in the discussion of substantive law courses. A further shift in 
pedagogical praxis is warranted, a shift that entails a new perspective on 
the production of knowledge in law school, in the nature of knowledge 
about law.134 This means a perspective that also recognizes the students as 
producers of knowledge and empowers them to explore further. In general, 
Lisa M. Landreman asserts that critical educators have not provided for 
alternative approaches to the organization of schools, curricula, pedagogy, 
 130.  Åsa GUNNARSSON, EVA-MARIA SVENSSON & MARGARET DAVIES, EXPLOITING THE LIMITS 
OF LAW: SWEDISH FEMINISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO PESSIMISM 1–15 (Åsa Gunnarsson ed., Ashgate 
2007).  
 131.  See, e.g., Bell & Edmonds, supra note 11, at 26–27; Falcon et al., supra note 74, at 269. 
 132.  MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, TEACHING LAW BY
DESIGN: ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE FINAL EXAM 7 (2009) (“Students engage 
in crucial mental activity when they negotiate meaning and seek to synthesize their personal under-
standings. The hundreds of studies demonstrating the superiority of cooperative learning groups com-
pared to all other teaching methods support this assertion.”). 
 133.  Montoya, supra note 11, at 305. 
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social relations, or day-to-day practice.135 This is an attempt to address the 
lack of alternative approaches. 
B. A Different Role for the Teacher 
To be a good facilitator for social justice, educators have to move be-
yond the mere understanding of the theory of oppression and social justice 
education.136 As Landreman has expertly explained, “Social justice educa-
tion requires awareness of content and process, and an ability to simultane-
ously participate in the process and step outside of it to assess and mediate 
interactions in the group.”137
The professor should be a facilitator of learning, a guide and an ally, 
not the repository of knowledge. To be good guides for this learning jour-
ney we must liberate ourselves of the constraints of traditional pedagogy. 
Being a good guide includes arranging the physical space in a way that 
minimizes distances and hierarchy, designing developmentally appropriate 
training, and working with students to create opportunities to reflect on 
their salient learning experiences.138 A good guide also helps students ex-
plore who they are and what matters to them and provides opportunities to 
practice their new learning in the process.139
In their article on facilitating social justice learning, Vicente M. 
Lechuga and others identified three key components facilitators should 
remember to address. First, facilitators should provide pre-activity reflec-
tion and discussion about the social justice issue being addressed. They 
should engage in an activity that allows participants to apply their experi-
ences and previous knowledge to current events or familiar acts of social 
injustice (i.e., allow them to engage in reflective action). Finally, they 
should evaluate the outcomes of their actions to determine if any other 
actions should follow, and allow for introspection on the experience.140
These recommendations can be seen at work in the way Derrick Bell 
organized his classroom. It encouraged interdisciplinary conversations by 
 135.  See Lisa M. Landreman & Christopher MacDonald-Dennis, The Evolution of Social Justice 
Education and Facilitation, in THE ART OF EFFECTIVE FACILITATION: REFLECTIONS FROM SOCIAL 
JUSTICE EDUCATORS 3, 9, 14–15 (Lisa M. Landreman ed., Stylus 2013). 
 136.  Id. at 15. 
 137.  Pat Griffin & Mathew L. Ouellett, Facilitating Social Justice Education Courses, in
TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 89, 90 (Maurianne Adams et al. eds.,
1997). 
 138.  Kent D. Syverud, Taking Students Seriously: A Guide for New Law Teachers, 43 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 247, 259 (1993). 
 139.  See Landreman & MacDonald-Dennis, supra note 135, at 9–10. 
 140.  Vicente M. Lechuga et al., Power, Privilege, and Learning: Facilitating Encountered Situa-
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students, created a relaxed learning environment, cemented personal inter-
actions among students and between students and the professor, and deliv-
ered detailed feedback to students regarding the progress of their work.141
As an ally in the classroom, the professor strives to aid the learning of 
both privileged and marginalized students alike. Drawing on the work of 
other critical pedagogues of privilege, Kim A. Case has defined the role of 
the ally as follows: “A dominant group member who works to end oppres-
sion in his or her personal or professional life through support of and as an 
advocate with and for, the oppressed population.”142
Furthermore, for Case, “[b]ecoming an ally in the classroom requires 
not only attention to social location and intersections of identity, but also to 
pedagogical strategies to promote student engagement” through learning in 
a way that connections are made between oppression and students’ life 
experiences.143 To be able to achieve these connections, professors need to 
care.144 Caring includes a concern for law students beyond the pure aca-
demic focus; it requires being mindful of the social and cultural factors that 
also impact students.145 This often requires a deliberate exercise from the 
teacher, but not a tremendous amount of effort: 
Non-verbal information, such as maintaining eye contact, smiling, facial 
expressions and arm gestures are particularly important. In fact, it has 
been found that these behavioural subtleties, throughout a term of study, 
contribute more to the classroom atmosphere than significant structural 
changes at the beginning of a term. Learning students’ names, arriving at 
class early so as to engage in some informal time with students, and the 
manner of classroom leadership and control are simple methods of creat-
ing an optimal learning environment for students without in any way 
 141.  Radice, supra note 112, at 46; Vinay Harpalani, From Roach Power to Radical Humanism: 
Professor Derrick Bell’s “Critical” Constitutional Pedagogy, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. xxiii (2013). 
 142.  Case, supra note 14, at 2; see also Sandra L. Neumann, The “Why’s” and “How’s” of Being 
a Social Justice Ally, in GETTING CULTURE: INCORPORATING DIVERSITY ACROSS THE CURRICULUM
65–75 (Regan A. R. Gurung & Loreto R. Prieto eds., 2009). 
 143.  Case, supra note 14, at 9. In the context of teaching about privilege, Case has proposed a 
model of privilege studies pedagogy that cuts through different subject matters and:  
[1] analyzes privilege and power in teaching about privilege . . . [2] emphasizes the definition 
of privilege . . . [3] focuses on the invisibility of privilege . . . [4] teaches privilege across a 
wide variety of oppressions . . . [5] frames learning about privilege through an intersectional 
theory perspective . . . [6] involves educator personal reflection on privilege . . . [7] encour-
ages critical analysis through student reflection and writing about their own privileged identi-
ties . . . [8] promotes social action to dismantle privilege . . . [9] values the voice of the 
marginalized and oppressed . . . and [10] infuses learning about privilege across the curricu-
lum . . . . 
Id. at 4. 
 144.  A caring pedagogy necessarily involves a more expansive notion of education. Roberto L. 
Corrada, Toward an Ethic of Teaching: Class, Race and the Promise of Community Engagement, 50 
VILL. L. REV 837, 839 (2005). 
 145.  Nelson E. Soto, Caring and Relationships: Developing a Pedagogy of Caring, 50 VILL. L.
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compromising the content and rigour of the class. That is, the teacher’s 
attitude, enthusiasm and passion are main ingredients of an effective 
teaching and learning environment.146
For Nikki Bromberger, these techniques are particularly important if the 
professor is using a version of the case method to conduct class: 
This teaching method can be stressful for students, as it creates pressure 
to look intelligent in front of classmates and gives rise to fear of humilia-
tion when students are unable to respond to the lecturer’s questions. For 
many students, a traditional Socratic classroom becomes a forum for stu-
dents to judge one another, rather than one focused on learning.147
 Professors could set as a class objective the creation of a space for 
dialogue from different points of view.148 If the professor is to be a facilita-
tor in a collaborative venture towards knowledge, the professor has to be 
available to the students because learning is not confined to the classroom. 
It also entails providing constant feedback and listening to students’ points 
of view.149 Listening to the students’ points of view also includes creating 
spaces for students to voice their perspectives regarding pedagogy. An 
alternative is the creation of Student Advisory Teams150 or Student Adviso-
ry Groups151 where students choose representatives to periodically meet 
with the professor regarding the effectiveness of teaching.152 In these peri-
odic meetings, students provide constructive criticism of teaching, teachers 
counter criticisms and explain methods, and students gain a sense of own-
ership in the classroom.153
C. From Authority to Collaboration 
We need to supplant authority as the basis for the relationship between 
professors and students. I propose a shift from authority to collaboration as 
partners in the classroom.154 Authority is defined by the professor’s right to 
146.  Nikki Bromberger, Enhancing Law Student Learning—The Nurturing Teacher, 1 L. EDUC.
REV. 45, 53 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147.  Id. at 53–54. 
 148.  Montoya, supra note 11, at 298. 
 149.  Derrick Bell has been praised by progressive and conservative students alike for his ability to 
listen and to provide extensive feedback to students. Harpalani, supra note 141. 
 150.  Gerald F. Hess, Student Involvement in Improving Law Teaching and Learning, 67 UMKC L.
REV. 343, 343 (1998). 
 151.  See generally SHOR, supra note 127. 
 152.  See Eric W. Orts, Quality Circles in Law Teaching, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 425, 431 (1997). 
 153.  See id.
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command and the students’ duty to obey.155 It is a social construction that 
can be negotiated by students and professors and is shaped by a multiplicity 
of factors.156 We can transform authority into collaboration by negotiation 
and consent by making students more in control of their educational pro-
cess. 
Collaboration in the classroom means learning together to achieve 
shared learning goals. “Collaborative learning occurs when students and 
faculty work together to create knowledge.”157 So the first step in the pro-
cess is to establish shared objectives, which means that the semester initi-
ates with the professor proposing a syllabus and teaching methods and 
negotiating with students. Once the learning objectives are agreed upon, the 
co-laboring and cooperation part begins and meaningful learning hap-
pens.158 Here the role of the professor is less like a traditional expert and 
more akin to a peer.159 The characteristics of a collaborative classroom can 
be summarized as follows: shared knowledge among teachers and students, 
shared authority among teachers and students, teachers as mediators, and 
accommodation of multiple identities.160
In a collaborative learning classroom, the teacher as facilitator indi-
rectly structures the conversation and proposes learning tasks.161 Collabora-
tive learning has been explored successfully, albeit in limited fashion, in 
law school. Clifford S. Zimmerman has written extensively on using col-
laborative learning in law school, particularly in legal writing courses.162
Collaborative teaching has been a standard practice in clinical teaching for 
decades. Collaborative learning benefits the individual student, the class, 
and the institution.163 Through this type of leaning, students have been 
found to develop better community interaction and gain mastery of the 
 155.  Judith L. Pace & Annette Hemmings, Understanding Authority in Classrooms: A Review of 
Theory, Ideology, and Research, 77 REV. EDUC. RES. 4, 6 (2007). 
 156.  Id. at 5. 
 157.  Roberta S. Matthews, Collaborative Learning: Creating Knowledge with Students, in
TEACHING ON SOLID GROUND: USING SCHOLARSHIP TO IMPROVE PRACTICE 101 (Robert J. Menges et 
al. eds., 1st ed. 1996). 
 158.  Id. at 112–13. 
 159.  Id. at 107. 
 160.  M.B. Tinzmann et al., What is the Collaborative Classroom?, N. CENT. REGIONAL EDUC.
LABORATORY (1990), available at
http://methodenpool.uni-koeln.de/koopunterricht/The%20Collaborative%20Classroom.htm. 
 161.  Clifford S. Zimmerman, “Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation:” Reflections on Collabo-
rative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 957, 997 
(1999). 
 162.  Id. See also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 2243–46 on using collaborative teaching in civil 
rights courses. 
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subject and a more positive feeling about their studies.164 This last benefit 
is in stark contrast with students’ views of the case method. Unfortunately, 
even some Outcrit scholars are hesitant to trust the students as peers and 
collaborators in learning. For example, some have justified the need to 
preserve “cold calling, seating charts, and Socratic dialogue among other 
signs of authority”165 due to “unprofessional students.”166 Possible lack of 
preparation by students is a problem present across methodologies and less 
present in more authoritarian classrooms.167 Collaborative learning research 
has shown that students are more comfortable, engaged, and satisfied in a 
collaborative learning environment.168 Students also learn better in a safer 
space. 
D. Diversification 
Using diverse methods of teaching allows for different student voices 
to be heard. There is a wide array of teaching methods that can be used to 
diversify teaching beyond the case method. Examples include the problem 
solving method, simulation and role-play, co-teaching with practitioners, 
and dividing the group into law firms.169 Students can be tasked with pre-
senting themes in class as well as proponents of class materials and sub-
jects to be discussed, and professors can integrate video and interactive 
teaching tools that will allow students to anonymously vote and comment 
in real time.170
E. What We Can Save of the Current Teaching Model 
Within a diversified collaborative classroom there is also space for a 
pedagogy of questions. This is a practice proposed by Freire, which “forces 
and challenges the learners to think creatively and critically, and to adopt a 
critical attitude towards the world.”171 On the contrary, Freire strongly ob-
jected to the pedagogy of answers whereby teachers provide answers and 
solutions to learners, reducing learners to “mere receptacles for prepack-
 164.  Id. at 999. 
 165.  SpearIt, supra note 11, at 468. 
 166.  Id.
 167.  Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 1001. 
 168.  Matthews, supra note 157, at 118. 
 169.  See generally James Eagar, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical 
Methods in Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 389 (1997); Lawrence, supra note 11, at 2244 (discuss-
ing role-playing as a pedagogical technique). 
 170.  Matthews, supra note 157, at 108–09. 
 171.  Muhammad Kamarul Kabilan, Creative and Critical Thinking in Language Classrooms, 6 
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aged knowledge.”172 Freire felt that this pedagogy lacks profundity of 
thought and cannot stimulate and challenge learners to question, to doubt, 
and to reject.173 Furthermore, this practice of “feeding” the learners robs 
them of the opportunity to take responsibility for their actions and behav-
iors.174 Freire stressed that educators in general forget the fundamental 
questions that stimulate the answers. He encouraged and focused on ques-
tions rather than on answers. According to Freire, teachers are sometimes 
afraid of questions because they are unsure of the answers and also because 
maybe the questions might not correspond to the answers that they have. 
They feel much more secure to talk about the answers they already have.175
Feminist scholar Judith Fischer has expanded on the work of other 
feminists and has proposed what she has called the Portia Method, a peda-
gogy that is more supportive and rejects the notion that a nurturing envi-
ronment is not a rigorous learning environment.176 This method includes 
tempering the excesses of the case method, using diversified teaching tools, 
distributing more handouts, building better relationships among students 
and faculty, and hiring more diverse faculty. Law schools that have fol-
lowed this approach, such as Chapman Law School, have significantly 
improved women’s law school experiences. 
There is space for a pedagogy of the question, but for it to be effective 
it should be used within the context of what Gerald F. Hess has called the 
eight components of an optimal law school classroom environment: “re-
spect, high expectations, support, collaboration, inclusion, engagement, 
delight and feedback.”177
CONCLUSION
More than sixty-five years ago W.E.B. DuBois said that of all the 
freedoms of which we can think, the freedom to learn is in the long run the 
most necessary.178 It stands to reason then that the process of learning itself 
 172.  Neal Bruss & Donaldo P. Macedo, Toward a Pedagogy of the Question: Conversations with 
Paulo Freire, 167 J. EDUC. 7, 8 (1985). 
 173.  Id. at 7–21 (1985). 
 174.  Arthur L. Costa & Robert Marzano, Teaching the Language of Thinking, 45 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 29, 30–31 (1987). 
 175.  Bruss & Macedo, supra note 172. 
 176.  Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment on 
Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 89–90 (1996); see also Bailey, supra note 
83, at 145. This builds on the “ethic of care” proposed by Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 78. 
 177.  Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: the Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School,
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 76 (2002). 
 178.  W.E.B. DU BOIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 1920–1963, 256 
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has to be a liberating one for it to be truly free. Derrick Bell has reminded 
us that law schools should be “place[s] where things are tried.”179 He goes 
on to say that not all experiments succeed but we should be willing to take 
appropriate risks to achieve law schools that serve all in the future.180 At-
tempting to shift power within the classroom is no small proposition, and it 
is often an unwelcome change both by students and colleagues.181
In the case of women and professors of color who already face a “pre-
sumption of incompetence,”182 they risk the presumption being confirmed 
in the eyes of students and colleagues by their alternative pedagogy. It rep-
resents a counter hegemonic change that might not be without conse-
quence.183 Professor Reginald Leamon Robinson details his experiences as 
a professor of color trying to teach outside the mainstream and how col-
leagues and students alike marginalized him. He explains that: “Due to 
Americans’ commitment to a white cultural matrix, white male professors 
have defined the parameters of good law teaching in a manner which reifies 
their values, morals, and standards, and which questions implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, the intellectual acumen of minority law profes-
sors.”184
Challenging traditional pedagogy also implies an added risk to those 
of us that are yet to be tenured or operate outside the tenure stream.185 But 
as we take risks, we also make the path easier for those yet to come, “so 
that it doesn’t hurt and tear and bruise the next person coming after us quite 
so much.”186 “Courage is a decision you make to act in a way that works 
through your own fear for the greater good as opposed to pure self-interest. 
Courage means putting at risk your self-interest for what you believe is 
right.”187
 179.  Bell, Constitutional Conflicts, supra note 112, at 244 (citing Eugene F. Scoles, Challenge and 
Response in Legal Education, 48 OR. L. REV. 129, 140 (1969)). 
 180.  Id. at 243. 
 181.  Chang & Davis, supra note 16, at 44; Lawrence, supra note 11, at 2254. 
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INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA 164, 177–78 (Gabriella Gutiéerrez y 
Muhs et al. eds., 2013). 
 183.  Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching from the Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-Text,
19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 151, 153 (1997).  
 184.  Id. at 164. 
 185.  Lazos, supra note 182, at 182. 
 186.  Christine Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for Indigenous Peo-
ples, 82 N.D. L. REV. 863, 867 (2006). 
 187.  Nagae, supra note 73, at xli (quoting DERRICK BELL JR., ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE 
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As Outcrit scholars and professors, we are instructors of living an eth-
ic of anti-subordination life, personally and professionally. To use Derrick 
Bell’s words—”[c]lassrooms are vehicles to communicate not just the sub-
ject, but self.”188
 188.  Natasha Martin, Derrick Bell: Ethical Ambition and Law Teaching, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
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